ANNEX G-11
Marine Corps’ Amphibious Operations in the Vietnam War
Edited by Ray Stewart
When planning for amphibious operations in Vietnam was first initiated, it was not wholly obvious to the planners that the amphibious forces must consider the desires of a friendly government, the Government of (South) Vietnam (GVN), and its military commanders ashore. No one supposed that the doctrine ascribing absolute authority of the Amphibious Task Force commander within the boundary of the amphibious objective area (AOA) would be questioned e.g., by COMUSMACV in Saigon.
However, this authority was questioned, and it was pointed out that the land space within the defined AOA was occupied to a large extent by innocent civilians loyal to the government of Vietnam and there were certain rules considered and developed to ensure their safety. Additionally, the authority of the amphibious task force commander within the air-space of the amphibious objective area was questioned by both military and commercial entities.
It was pointed out that a friendly U.S. military commander ashore was conducting air operations, the Vietnamese air force was conducting air operations, and certain civilian air transportation agencies were continuing commercial air operations along the coast line of South Vietnam all of which had to be considered in any operational planning.
This situation became even more complex to the planners when the question of security was posed. Who should be told that an amphibious operation in a selected area of South Vietnam was forthcoming? As a point, it was observed that security leaks could occur if civilian aircraft agencies were directed to deviate from their commercial route for a period of time. Soon it would become obvious to the enemy that when such a restriction was imposed, an amphibious operation would be forthcoming in the area where the commercial air route was re-established. Other related security problems can be visualized.
Above taken from “Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam: What Marines Should Talk to Each Other About” by LtCol P. L. Hilgartner, Marine Corps Gazette, Jan69, pp. 28-31
The importance in keeping criticism of the Marine Corps’ role in the Vietnam War as other than “a second land army” and maintain its unique capabilities as an amphibious force, the Navy/Marine Corps Team developed a scenario of multiple amphibious raids to be conducted along the coast of South Vietnam against known or suspected Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army activity. The first series of operations was named “Dagger Thrust”: The second “Deckhouse”. The Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force (SLF) with its Battalion Landing Team (BLT) as the ground component embarked in Navy’s amphibious, ships was the amphibious organization given this mission.
Tank and Antitank (Ontos) units were attached to, and in support of, the infantry battalions that comprised the ground force of the SLF. The infantry battalions were re-designated Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) when they joined the SLF with the several combat support and combat service support units under its command. The following article, authored by Peter Brush, emphasizes their presence in all the Special Landing Force’s operations during the Vietnam War. Details of the activities of tanks and Ontos once ashore are provided in the series “U.S. Marine Tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War”.
Marine Corps Armor in the Special Landing Force (SLF)
Vietnam War 1965-1970
The U. S. Navy Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group and Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF) was the Pacific Command’s strategic reserve for the Far East. The ARG was the Navy component, and typically consisted of three or four ships including an amphibious assault ship (LPH), a dock landing ship (LSD), an attack transport (APA) or an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a tank landing ship (LST). Other amphibious vessels could be included. The SLF Marine command element was organized much like a Marine infantry regimental staff. It consisted of a Marine battalion landing team (BLT) composed of a Marine infantry battalion reinforced with armor, artillery, engineer, and other support units, plus a Marine helicopter squadron. (GB-66).
The Special Landing Force In 1965
First established in 1960, the SLF deployed to South Vietnam with the very first deployment of American ground forces into Vietnam when BLT 2/9 (2d Battalion, 9th Marines) served as the reserve for the Marine landing at Da Nang in March 1965. In mid-April, the SLF was temporarily dissolved when its amphibious assets were required for the landing of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) at the new base and airfield south of Da Nang - Chu Lai. However, Senior Marine and Navy commanders agreed the SLF should be reconstituted as soon as the necessary amphibious-capable shipping became available. On 19 June, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, (FMFPac) reactivated the SLF. Its primary mission was to conduct amphibious raids to reduce enemy infiltration by sea and disrupt the buildup of enemy forces along the coast of South Vietnam. (GB-65).
The next landing of the SLF was Operation STARLITE, the largest battle of the war to that date. In mid-August 1965, Marine intelligence believed the 1st Viet Cong Regiment was preparing to attack the new Marine air base at Chu Lai in Quang Tin province. Major General Lewis Walt, commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), developed his plan to launch a preemptive attack against the entrenched VC regiment. The enemy was located on the Van Tuong Peninsula, 10 miles south of Chu Lai. (See Fig. 1) The Marine amphibious assault would employ heliborne and amphibious assaults plus fire support from air, artillery, and naval gunfire along with rapidity of movement to achieve surprise. Pressed for infantry battalions, Gen Walt decided to use the SLF, which was, at that time, over 700 miles away at Subic Bay, the Philippines, as part of the multi-battalion attacking force. The BLT with the SLF was 3/7 commanded by LtCol Charles H. Bodley. The Tank Platoon – 3d Platoon (Rein), “B” Company, 1st Tank Battalion was led by 2dLt R.A. Stewart. The Antitank (Ontos) Platoon (Rein) was led by 2dLt Manfred Wood.
The Marines began moving into position in AOA on 17 August to confront the VC force of approximately 1,500 fighters armed with recoilless rifles and mortars. Marines commenced landing across the beach and inland by helicopter on 18 August. By early afternoon fighting became extensive. The Regimental Landing Team (RLT) Commander, Colonel Oscar Peatross, decided to commit the reserve SLF BLT 3/7, which had been offshore since about 0930 hours having just arrived from Subic Bay, PI.
Operation Starlite saw 51 Marines killed in the fight. 614 VC were KIA in the battle, which lasted until 24 August. Marine tanks and Ontos from various units played a major role in the overwhelming success of the operation. The BLT finished back loading on 24 August at 1930 hours and returned to Subic Bay. Although the infantry companies of the BLT were landed, its tanks (3/B/1TK) and Ontos (3/C/1AT) evidently were not: according to the 3/7 Command Chronology, “… the heavy weapons and equipment attachments of the BLT remained at sea off the area of operations.” (GB-65)(CC-3/7, 8/65) (FF-AR).
During July “BLT 2/7 relieved BLT 3/7, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon Utter, in Qui Nhon, RVN on 7 July 1965. First Lieutenant John Warner was the Platoon Commander of the Second Platoon(-)(Rein), “B” Company, First Tank Battalion, First Marine Division (2/B/1stTk’s) and Lieutenant Harvey Schmitt was the Second Platoon Commander, Company “C”, First Antitank Battalion, First Marine Division (2/C/1AT’s).
In the fall of 1965, a series of five amphibious raids (Operation DAGGER THRUST I-V) were conducted by the SLF along the coast of central South Vietnam. Tanks from 2/A/1TK and Ontos from 2/A/1AT served as the armor component of the BLT (2/1). Results ranged from disappointing to modest. Overall, the assaults failed to achieve their objectives, which was the rapid exploitation of intelligence in order to make contact with large enemy units. (GB-65). In “Volume One – 1965” of “U.S. Marine Tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War” tank and antitank participation – such as it was – in each of the five DAGGER THRUST operations is addressed in some detail.
Operation PIRHANA, with BLT 1/7 the SLF’s ground force with tanks and Ontos attached, took place 7-10 September 1965. It was an amphibious raid on the Batangan Peninsula, about 20 miles south of Chu Lai. Marine armor consisted of 1/B/1TK and 1/C/1AT. With this operation, the entire reinforced tank and Ontos platoons were landed by 0910 hours on the first day of the operation. Tanks and Ontos supported the infantry in seizing various objectives. The enemy had constructed tank traps on the roads, the largest measuring 20’ x 10’ x 8’ deep. Ontos also provided security for the battalion command post, while tanks served with the battalion mobile reserve. 178 VC were killed in the operation. Marine casualties included two KIA. (CC-1/5, 9/65). No Tankers or Ontos crewmen were casualties. In Volume One of “U.S. Marine Tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War”, details of both tank and Ontos participation are addresses.
November 1965 saw the launch of the two-phased Operation BLUE MARLIN, a search and clear operation between the coast and Route 1 in the Da Nang – Chu Lai corridor. On 15 November, a combined force consisting of BLT 2/7 and the 3d South Vietnamese Marine Battalion landed on the beach about 15 miles north of Chu Lai. The force swept south to Chu Lai but encountered no enemy forces. A platoon each of tanks and Ontos (2/B/1TK and 2/C/1AT) were attached to 2/7 as elements of the BLT, but were unloaded administratively at Chu Lai later in the operation. (CC-2/7, 11/65).
The second phase of Operation BLUE MARLIN commenced on 16 November with BLT 3/3. The battalion landed south of Da Nang and moved north. The tanks were a platoon from C/3TK; Ontos were a platoon from B/3AT. As with Phase I, enemy contact was light. No Marines were killed on the operation. VC casualties were 25 KIA. At the end of the operation, 3/3 moved to Da Nang by amphibious shipping and helicopter. (GB-65)(CC-2/7, 11/65).
The SLF served as the reserve force during Operation HARVEST MOON (9 December – 19 December 1965). This was a multi-battalion Marine-ARVN operation in the Que Son Valley along the border of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. The enemy was the same (now reconstituted, re-armed, better trained and equipped) VC regiment the Marines fought in Operation STARLITE.
THE SLF IN 1966
The first SLF operation of 1966 was DOUBLE EAGLE (28 January – 1 March) with BLT 2/3. The location was Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces at the boundary of I and II Corps. A platoon each of tanks and Ontos (2/A/3TK and 2/A/3AT) were attached to the BLT. Casualties were light, with five friendly KIA. According to the command chronology, “at no time did the enemy stand and fight.” (CC-2/3, 1-2/66).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rung_Sat_Special_Zone
Rung Sat Special Zone
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Rung Sat Special Zone (Vietnamese: Đặc khu Rừng Sác) was the name given during the Vietnam War by the South Vietnam Government and American forces to a large area of the Sác Forest (Vietnamese Rừng Sác), which is today known as the Cần Giờ Mangrove Forest. It was also known as the "Forest of Assassins." The name was derived from a misinterpretation of the Vietnamese word Sát to mean "assassin". The actual name, Rừng Sác, is a Sino-Vietnamese word that roughly translated to "salty forest," a reference to its proximity to the saltwater marshes of the delta.
History
The Sác Forest comprises approximately 1,256 square kilometres (485 sq. mi) of tidal mangrove swamp including over 4,800 kilometres (3,000 mi) of interlocking streams located approximately 36 kilometres (22 mi) south-southeast of Saigon. Its boundaries in 1962 were Nhà Bè District and Nhơn Trạch District to the north, Long An Province and Tiền Giang Province to the west, Phước Tuy Province to the east and the South China Sea to the south.
On 8 June 1962, the South Vietnamese Government organized the Rung Sat Special Zone (Đặc khu Rừng Sác) as a military region in order to defend the Lòng Tàu River, the main shipping channel from Saigon to Vũng Tàu.
The Viet Cong established base areas in the zone from the late 1950s and in April 1966 COSVN designated the area as the D-10 Special Military Zone.
Due to the difficult conditions for ground operations within the zone, the VC regarded it as a safe area, however from 1965 onwards the USAF began defoliating the area as part of Operation Ranch Hand.
Following attacks on allied shipping on the Lòng Tàu River, from 27 March to 6 April 1966, 1st Battalion 5th Marines and two Battalions of Vietnamese Marines launched Operation Jackstay, a search and clear operation along the Lòng Tàu shipping channel killing 63 VC and seizing and destroying large supply caches.
Following the conclusion of Operation Jackstay, the Marines handed over responsibility for the zone to the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment. Responsibility for security in the zone was then passed to the Mobile Riverine Force and the 9th Infantry Division.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tBQNEseSIA Gives an idea of Rung Sat terrain.
The next deployment of the SLF during 1966 occurred when the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commander General William Westmoreland directed the SLF to attack Viet Cong (VC) forces in the Rung Sat Special Zone. This area, south of Saigon, contained enemy units, which were attacking commercial shipping in the river channel leading to the capital. Marines of BLT 1/5 in Operation JACKSTAY (26 March – 6 April) were only partially successful in clearing the VC from the Rung Sat. Although the swampy terrain did not allow tracked vehicles to be deployed, Marines from 1/B/1AT used the operation to experiment with Riverine Warfare techniques that included positioning Ontos on the cleared deck areas of a LST (Landing Ship, Tank) in order to provide a direct fire capability. A platoon of M-48 tanks from 3/C/1TK was included in the BLT. Casualties were light: 63 enemy were confirmed KIA, five Marine KIA. (CC-1/5, 2-5/66). Needless to say: Neither tanks nor Ontos saw a lot of action in this arena but the ever mindful Ontos crewmen and Tankers did not lack aggressive and innovative ways to use their weapons.
Deckhouse I – 18-30 June 1966. South of Qui Nhon
Deckhouse II – 18 July 1966. DMZ
Deckhouse III – 16-29 August, 1966. Saigon.
Deckhouse IV – 15-24 September 1966. DMZ
Deckhouse V – 6-15 January 1967. Delta region
Deckhouse VI – 16 February to 3 March 1967. Northern I Corps
Operation JACKSTAY was followed by Operation OSAGE, 27 April – 2 May, in Phu Loc district, Thua Thien province. Attached to BLT 1/5, five Ontos with 18 Marine personnel were landed over the beach in support of B/1/5. There was little enemy contact. Enemy KIAs totaled 11; friendly KIAs were 6. (CC-1/5, 2-5/66).
At this time, General Westmoreland communicated to Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), that the changing nature of the war warranted a change in the mission of the SLF. Senior MACV and Navy commanders agreed to broaden the scope of ARG/SLF attacks. These amphibious operations, named DECKHOUSE, would complement allied ground operations against enemy forces.
Operation DECKHOUSE I took place in II Corps in Phu Yen Province from 18 June to 30 June. The landing force (BLT 3/5) supported the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division’s Operation NATHAN HALE. A platoon of tanks from 2/C/1TK and a platoon of Ontos from 3/B/1AT provided armor. Marines from the tank and Ontos platoons landed as “provisional rifle platoons” (aka: without their tracks!) to provide security for Marine artillery and amphibious tractor units. BLT 3/5 made no major contact with enemy forces during the operation. Marine casualties included 2 KIA while 25 VC were confirmed killed. Although the SLF contribution was modest, the operation overall involved several US battalions and resulted in the deaths of over 400 enemy. (CC-3/5, 6/66).
DECKHOUSE II was an amphibious assault eight miles northeast of Dong Ha in Quang Tri province, near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). BLT 3/5, training at Subic Bay in the Philippines, sailed for Vietnam on 13 July. The assault took place on 16 July in support of Operation HASTINGS. After two days, the BLT was placed under the control the Marine units involved in HASTINGS. Three tanks from 2/C/1TK were landed to operate with an infantry company. There was little contact with the enemy. The BLT suffered no combat casualties. On 30 July it withdrew and moved to Chu Lai. (GB-66)(CC-3/5, 7/66).
August saw the next amphibious assault by the SLF. Operation DECKHOUSE III took place from 16 to 29 August on the Vung Tau Peninsula southwest of Saigon. BLT 1/26 included a platoon each of tanks from 1/A/5TK and Ontos from 1/A/5AT. The amphibious assault was in conjunction with the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade Operation TOLEDO. The AT platoon Marines were helilifted ashore on 17 August to serve as a provisional rifle platoon. The following day the tank platoon Marines landed by helicopter at a different landing zone to serve as a provisional rifle platoon to provide security for the 107mm Mortar Battery. The results of the operation were meager: two VC and three Marines were killed in action. (GB-66)(CC-1/26, 8/66).
In September, the SLF returned to the DMZ area. DECKHOUSE IV, with BLT 1/26, was launched on 15 September in support of Operation PRAIRIE (the same operational area as DECKHOUSE II and Operation HASTINGS). A platoon of tanks and Ontos from 1/A/5TK and 1/A/5AT were assigned to the BLT, which was located at Subic Bay prior to the operation. The tanks and Ontos, landed on the beach by landing craft, were later transported by boat upriver to Dong Ha, where they deployed into the field. On 18 September control of the BLT was passed to the 4th Marines for the duration of PRAIRIE. During the operation, the BLT fought NVA regulars who used conventional tactics, made little attempt to avoid combat, and sought to engage the BLT by ambush and from fortified positions. Tanks suffered damage from antitank mines. On 21 September, two tanks were hit by antitank rockets fired by a four-man NVA rocket team. Damage to the tanks was minor; when one tank fired canister at a range of 75 yards, “the four NVA’s were disintegrated.” Antitank rockets again struck the tank platoon while withdrawing at the end of the operation. Tanks and Ontos returned to their ships on 25 September and embarked for Da Nang. 34 Marines from BLT 1/26 were killed; 254 enemy were confirmed KIA by body count. (GB-66)(CC-1/26, 9/66).
During October and November 1966, the ARG/SLF kept a Marine BLT afloat off the northern coast of South Vietnam. BLT 3/26 (with 3/A/5TK and 3/A/5AT) replaced BLT 1/26. In December, BLT 1/9 (with 3/B/3TK and 3/C/3AT) relieved 3/6 as the landing force battalion.
ARG/SLF operations to the end of 1966 had little in common with historic amphibious warfare. Most Marine amphibious landings in Vietnam were administrative landings, efforts to exploit existing situations, or amphibious raids. Rather than assaulting hostile shores, the BLT’s landed where friendly ground and air forces were already present. According to Marine Colonel John Chaisson, Assistant Chief of Staff, III MAF, SLF operations for the most part “were sort of contrived. It was almost a concept looking for a home.” (GB-66).
THE SLF IN 1967
The first SLF landing of the year was DECKHOUSE V, 6 January to 15 January. The landing took place in Thanh Phu and Kein Hoa provinces in the Mekong Delta and involved BLT 1/9 (with tanks from 3/B/3TK and Ontos from 3/C/3AT) plus the 3d and 4th Battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. The Vietnamese Marines underwent “a near record-breaking ship-to-shore landing-craft move pf 23 miles,” rivaled only by some U.S. Pacific operations in World War II (GB-67). The sweep was unproductive: 21 VC and 7 Marines died in the operation. The poor results were probably due to enemy forces having prior knowledge of the operation, giving them the opportunity to move their supplies and personnel out of the area. DECKHOUSE V was the last operation conducted outside of I Corps. (CC-1/9, 1/67).
After DECKHOUSE V, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to form a second SLF and to concentrate SLF operations in I Corps. In late January, BLT 1/4 replaced 1/9. Sailing from the Philippines, the BLT arrived off the Vietnamese coast in mid-February. Tanks from 1/A/3TK and Ontos from 2/B/3AT were included in the BLT, which made an amphibious landing in Quang Ngai province on 16 February to begin Operation DECKHOUSE VI. The opening phase was uneventful. Ontos were used to destroy roadblocks and caves. Tanks and Ontos were employed with good effect in support of Marine infantry during search and destroy operations. On 26 February the BLT withdrew. On 27 February it landed ten miles north in Phase II of the operation, which terminated on 3 March. Marine casualties were 12 KIA. 279 VC were reported killed. (GB-67)(CC-1/4, 2/67).
The SLF with BLT 1/4 was next landed the following month north of the Cua Viet River in Quang Tri province. Operation BEACON HILL I was in response to the NVA threat in the eastern section of the DMZ, and was in conjunction with Operation PRAIRIE III to the west. BEACON HILL ended on 1 April and resulted in the deaths of 334 NVA soldiers and 29 SLF Marines. (GB-67).
After Beacon Hill, the Marine Corps employed a twin SLF concept. BLT 1/3 joined SLF Alpha while BLT 2/3 became part of SLF Bravo. Both groups sailed from Okinawa and arrived on station near the DMZ by 18 April.
Operation BEACON STAR (22 April - 12 May) was SLF Bravo’s first operation. The location was a VC base area along the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. BLT 2/3 tanks were from 1/A/3TK and Ontos from 2/A/3AT. The battalion landed with minimal resistance. The operation was interrupted on 26 April when large NVA formations were discovered in the hills west of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB), 43 miles west of the BEACON STAR area. Three of the BLT 2/3’s companies moved by helicopter and C-130 transport aircraft to Khe Sanh in less than seven hours. The second phase of BEACON HILL is known as the “First Battle of Khe Sanh” or the “The Hill Fights.” (SF-EM). Fighting was heavy: the BLT had 71 KIA and 349 WIA before the unit began the return to the ships of the Amphibious Ready Group on 10 May. (GB-67).
The other SLF, SLF Alpha, was formed on Okinawa on 1 March. The BLT was 1/3 and included tanks from 3/C/3TK plus Ontos from 1/A/3AT. The BLT made its first landing in Vietnam on 28 April south of Da Nang at the Que Son Valley. This was Operation BEAVER CAGE (28 April – 12 May). The tanks and Ontos were landed at 0800 on the first day of the operation only to be back loaded aboard ship two days later. 55 Marines and 181 enemy were killed in the operation.
In response to the buildup of enemy rocket and artillery forces in the DMZ, General Westmoreland authorized the deployment of US military forces into the zone south of the actual border. Both SLF Alpha and SLF Bravo participated in the assaults: Operation BEAU CHARGER and Operation BELT TIGHT respectively. This was a unique amphibious assault plan in that it deployed both SLFs in the same operation at the same time. Both assaults were in support of ground operations by other U.S. Marine and ARVN units. BEAU CHARGER lasted two days, 18 -19 May. BELT TIGHT began on 20 May and ended on 23 May, after which operational control of SLF Bravo passed to the 9th Marines. 125 NVA were reported killed in these operations. (GB-67).
MACV increased its reliance on the ARG/SLF for the duration of 1967: not only did the number of combat days increase, the number of operations more than doubled compared to the first four months of the year. (GB-67).
SLF Alpha, with BLT 1/3, began Operation BEAR BITE on 2 June about 25 miles south of the DMZ. The operation was uneventful: there were no Marine casualties, two enemy were killed, and a tank got stuck in a rice paddy. The operation ended on 5 June.
The same SLF (less tanks and Ontos) participated in Operation COLGATE in Thua Thien province during the period 7-11 June. This operation was equally unproductive. There were no Marine casualties. The next operation was CHOCTAW, which involved sweeps along Route 1 in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien provincial border area. Again, no Marine casualties. Next was Operation MARYLAND, Thua Thien province, 25-27 June. None of these four operations achieved significant results. (GB-67).
SLF Bravo with BLT 2/3 operated further south, in the area south of Da Nang near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border. Operation BEACON TORCH began on 18 June. Tanks from 2/A/3TK and Ontos from 2/A/3AT were included in the BLT. Tanks were deployed during the first three days of the operation. Their use was of a more psychological than tactical benefit due to the lack of appropriate targets. As the operation moved further inland, the tanks returned to shipping due to their inability to ford a river. BEACON TORCH merged into Operation CALHOUN on 25 June. The BLT withdrew on 2 July. Although 86 enemy and 13 SLF Marines died in the fighting during these operations, there was no lasting impact: the Marines observed enemy troops near the beach during the BLT’s withdrawal. The VC seemed to completely control the uncooperative civilian population, who refused evacuation to government controlled areas in spite of air and artillery attacks. (GB-67)(CC 1/3, 6/27).
During the first of July, SLF Alpha was afloat, preparing for Operation BEAR CLAW, with eastern Quang Tri province as the landing site. Instead, on 3 July BLT 1/3 was ordered to join the 9th Marines which was engaged with a large enemy force in Operation BUFFALO at Con Thien. The BLT made a sweep in support of 3/9. On 6 July NVA rockets destroyed a Marine tank, killing the tank crew. Two other tanks were crippled. The BLT withdrew to Con Thien under enemy attack on 8 July, a withdrawal complicated by the need to remove two crippled tanks from the battlefield. After several days of patrolling the Con Thien perimeter, the BLT ended its participation in BUFFALO. The BLT suffered eight killed. Total NVA casualties for BUFFALO were 424. (GB-67).
SLF Alpha next participated in nearby Operation HICKORY II. Moving a few miles south, the BLT experienced no casualties and returned to its shipping on 17 July. (GB-67)
SLF Bravo with BLT 2/3 was also operating in the same area in July 1967. The tanks involved were 1/A/3TK and 1/B/3TK; Ontos were 1/A/3AT and 2/A/3AT. The operations were BEAVER TRACK, BUFFALO, and HICKORY II and under the operational control of the 3d Marines. The location was north of Cam Lo, just south of the southern edge of the DMZ. In the ensuing combat over the next few days, tanks received damage from by RPG rounds and antitank mines. Sixteen SLF Marines were killed before the battalion reembarked on 16 July. NVA casualties credited to the SLF totaled 148 KIA, including 16 confirmed by tank fire. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 7/67).
BLT 2/3’s next operation was Operation BEAR CHAIN, held in conjunction with the 4th Marines’ Operation FREMONT in the Thua Thien/Quang Tri border area. The BLT included tanks and Ontos from 2/A/3TK and 2/A/3AT. The tanks were landed early in the morning of the 20 July, the first day of the operation. Nine Marines and two Corpsmen were killed on the operation, along with 22 NVA (confirmed). On 26 July the BLT returned to its shipping. (CC 2/3, 7/67).
The last SLF operation of July 1967 was Operation BEACON GUIDE with SLF Alpha’s BLT 1/3. This search and destroy operation took place along the coast about 20 miles south of Hue. The operation was uneventful; casualties were negligible. SLF Alpha returned to its shipping on 30 July. (GB-67).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/3 (which included 2/A/3TK tanks and 2/A/3AT Ontos) spent the period 1 August – 21 August 1967 in Operations KANGAROO KICK and FREMONT. The operational area was the border region between Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Tanks and Ontos were not utilized. Three enemy soldiers and three Marines from the SLF were killed. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 8/67).
SLF Alpha operated further south in August, in the area between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. The BLT included tanks from 3/C/3TK and Ontos from 3/A/3AT. The Operations were BEACON GATE (7-11 August) and COCHISE (11-27 August). Tanks were deployed on these search and destroy operations, which resulted in the deaths of 59 enemy soldiers and nine Marines. (GB-67)(CC 1/3, 8/67).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/3 (1/A/3TK tanks and 2/A/3AT Ontos) went into action in eastern Quang Tri province on 27 August. The Operations were BELT DRIVE and LIBERTY, and terminated on 5 September. Tanks and Ontos were not deployed due to the nature of the BLT’s mission, which was to block NVA approaches to Quang Tri City and Route 1. Three Marines and 19 NVA/VC died during the operations. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 8-9/67).
In September 1967, Marine helicopter assets were greatly diminished due to the grounding of its CH-46A’s, which accounted for 50 percent of its helicopter capabilities. As a result, the SLF BLT’s were assigned to the OpCon of the Marine regiments operating in the area. They were employed on missions ranging from road security to the construction of fortifications, missions that had little to do with their traditional amphibious assault functions. (GB-67).
SLF Alpha, with BLT 1/3, engaged in two Operations during September 1967: BEACON POINT/FREMONT (1-9 September), Thua Thien province, and BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE (16-28 September), Quang Nam province (included tanks from 3/C/3TK). Casualties for the month were light: In 22 days of operations, eight Marines and 26 enemy soldiers lost their lives. (GB-67)(CC 1/3, 9/67).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/3, participated in Operation FORTRESS SENTRY during the period 17 September to 15 October. This operation was in conjunction with Operation KINGFISHER in the northeastern area of Quang Tri province. Tanks from 1/A/3TK and Ontos from 2/A/3AT were aboard the BLT. Tanks were deployed in the initial stages of the operation to provide security for the amphibious tractor movements. The tanks could not operate further inland due to their inability to ford wide streams in the maneuver areas. Two Marines and 89 NVA were killed in the operation before SLF Bravo ended its participation on 15 October. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 9/67).
SLF Alpha, with BLT 1/3 (which included tanks from 3/C/3TK and Ontos from 3/A/3AT), participated in Operations BASTION HILL/MEDINA from 10-19 October and LIBERTY II/FREMONT from 19-23 October. The operational area was the Hai Lang Forest south of Quang Tri City, an NVA base area. Tanks and Ontos were not landed. Marine and enemy casualties were about the same, approximately ten each. (GB-67).
The next operations for SLF Bravo and BLT 2/3 were FORMATION LEADER (17-18 October), LIBERTY II (18-24 October), and KNOX (24 October-4 November). The operational area was coastal Thua Thien province. The tanks and Ontos were landed at the Navy ramp at Hue. Bad weather impacted both the landing and embarkation. Contact was light. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 10/67).
SLF Alpha/BLT 1/3 returned to the Hai Lang Forest on 26 October in Operation GRANITE. Although tanks from 3/C/3TK were part of the BLT, the assault battalions were landed by helicopter. The operational objective was to locate and destroy an enemy base area; however, the operation was unable to locate its objective. The BLT moved north on 6 November to participate in Operation KENTUCKY around Cam Lo as the division reserve. After making a sweep around Con Thien near the DMZ, the BLT moved to Dong Ha and reembarked on 16 November. Casualties on these operations were light. (GB-67)(CC 1/3, 11/67).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/3, participated in Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER during the period 13-29 November. The location was a few miles south of Da Nang in Quang Nam province. Tanks from 2/A/3TK and Ontos from 2/A/3AT were part of the BLT. The Marines reported no deaths during the operation while claiming 48 confirmed NVA/VC kills. (GB-67)(CC 2/3, 11/67).
In December 3/1 became the new SLF Bravo battalion. After spending the first half of the month at the SLF Camp at Subic Bay in the Philippines, they returned to the I Corps area of South Vietnam. The tanks were from 3/C/1TK; Ontos from 3/C/1AT. On 21 December, Operation FORTRESS RIDGE commenced on 21 December with seaborne and helicopter landings around Gio Linh, near the DMZ. The tanks were landed on the beach by landing craft. On the morning of the following day, a tank was hit in the turret area by a recoilless rifle round. Tank crew casualties were one KIA and two WIA. On 23 December, a tank hit a 15-pound antitank mine, blowing off a portion of the tread. The tank was repaired. Ten Marines and ten enemy soldiers were killed before the operation ended on 24 December. All units were returned to their ships well before Christmas Eve. (GB-67)(CC 3/1, 12/67).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 3/1, ended the year with Operation BADGER TOOTH, which began on 26 December. The location was a coastal area in southern Quang Tri province. The objective was to find and destroy a large enemy force believed to be in the area. On the 27th, after coming under attack by a large enemy force, the BLT commander ordered the landing of the tank platoon from ARG shipping. Of the five tanks assigned to the BLT, one was under repair at Da Nang and another refused to start and had to remain afloat. Of the three remaining, none had been properly waterproofed, causing one to “submerge” while attempting to land. The other two received water damage to their communications equipment upon landing, rendering them unable to communicate with the infantry units except by voice. Nevertheless, the tanks were able to destroy some enemy bunkers with direct fire from their main guns. The Ontos were not landed. At 1800 hours on 31 December, a New Year’s truce took effect. Bad weather and rough seas hindered the withdrawal of the SLF to its shipping. The Marines suffered 48 killed during the operation, which ended on 2 January 1968. (GB-67)(GB-68)).
The last Operations of SLF Alpha and BLT 1/3 during 1967 were BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY V. These operations commenced on 24 November. The operational area was the coastal area just south of the DMZ. Tanks from 3/C/3TK and Ontos from 3/A/3AT were part of the BLT. Enemy contact was light, and most of the BLT’s effort was spent providing security completing the construction of defensive wires and minefields at Strongpoint A-3. On 29 December, the BLT left the operational area via a combined foot and motor march south to the airfield at Quang Tri. (GB-67)(CC 1/3, 11/67).
The ARG/SLF accounted for over 3,000 enemy killed during the year 1967. [“Amphibious Landings in South Vietnam.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam2-amphibious.htm. Retrieved 4/15/17].
THE SLF IN 1968
January 1968 saw much discussion by senior military commanders about the future role of the SLFs. MACV preferred these Marine units be stationed in-country continually. Marine commanders felt a strong need to work closely with the Navy to preserve Marine usage of Navy amphibious shipping. Was the SLF to be the reserve force for the entire Western Pacific, or more narrowly, a reinforcement of Navy/Marine forces in Vietnam? MACV Commander Westmoreland needed more troops, and was concerned the SLF tied up “two battalions of well-trained Marines who were floating around on the ships.” Should one of the SLF’s be based ashore permanently, rather than be kept afloat? Also at this time, Westmoreland was considering a possible amphibious landing north of the DMZ (Operation DURANGO CITY).
Discussions about the future role of the SLF were overtaken by events. Following the Tet Offensive, the SLF battalions became part of the III Marine Amphibious Force for all practical purposes. From the end of January until June 1968, the SLF battalions functioned like the other Marine infantry battalions of the 3d Marine Division in the northern part of South Vietnam. (GB-68).
In June 1968, the situation in the north had stabilized enough to allow the re-formation of the SLF’s. On 7 June, SLF Bravo with BLT 3/1 began Operation SWIFT SABER in the Elephant Valley area northwest of Da Nang. Tanks from 3/C/1TK and Ontos from 3/A/5AT were assigned to the BLT. Tanks were deployed along with amphibious tractors to move an infantry company to its objective. On 10 June, a tank struck a mine. Three Marines and no enemy were reported killed before the operation ended on 14 June. (GB-68)(CC 3/1, 6/68).
In July, 2/7 became the BLT for SLF Bravo, which included a platoon of tanks from 2/B/1TK and Ontos from 3/A/5AT. During the period 9-22 July, the SLF participated in Operations EAGER YANKEE and HOUSTON IV in Thua Thien province. During the period 23-31 July, the BLT moved south to participate in Operations SWIFT PLAY and ALLEN BROOK in the Go Noi Island area below Da Nang. Casualties were light in these search and destroy operations. After 31 July, the BLT was assigned the task of providing security for the heavy equipment destroying all natural and man-made structures that could provide cover for the enemy on Go Noi. (GB-68)(CC 2/7, 7/68).
During this period SLF Alpha, with BLT 2/4, was operating near the DMZ as part of Operation LANCASTER II. On 13 August, BLT 2/26 replaced 2/4 as the Alpha infantry unit. Here the BLT functioned as a regular infantry battalion during Operations PROUD HUNTER (18-21 August) and SWIFT PURSUIT (28 August-2 September). Into October, the BLT continued to operate under the control of the 3d Marines in the LANCASTER II area. (GB-68).
By mid-October, both SLFs were functioning much as they had before June: as regular infantry units fighting for extended periods ashore with other Marine units. SLF Alpha was attached to the 3d Marine Division; SLF Bravo to the 1st Marine Division.
On 19 October, SLF Alpha with BLT 2/26 (including tanks from 4/A/5TK and Ontos from 1/A/5AT) embarked from Quang Tri and moved south. On 26 October, the BLT came under OpCon of the 1st Marines and participated in Operation GARRARD BAY along the coast south of Da Nang. On 20 November, the BLT participated in Operation MEADE RIVER, another search and clearing operation in the same general area. Casualties were light; only seventeen enemy soldiers were reported killed in both operations. (GB-68)(CC 2/26, 11/68).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/7, remained attached to the 1st Marines until November, when it returned to its shipping. On 10 November, the BLT landed on the coast near Hoi An, South of Da Nang in Quang Nam province. This Operation, DARING ENDEAVOR, was a search and destroy operation in conjunction with the U.S. Army 1st Air Cavalry Division. Tanks were struck the following day by antitank mines, which caused minor casualties and damage. Infantry from G/2/7 provided a defensive perimeter for the disabled tanks. One Marine and 39 enemy soldiers were killed before the operation ended on 17 November. (GB-68)(CC 2/7, 11/68).
On 15 December, SLF Alpha with BLT 2/26 landed on Barrier Island, south of Hoi An and south of the earlier DARING ENDEAVOR operations. This was a cordon and search operation that lasted until 5 January 1969. The landings were by helicopter. The BLT returned to its shipping on 25 December where the BLT enjoyed the Christmas holiday. “Huge quantities” of Christmas “goodies” were received and distributed to the various units of the battalion. Early in the morning on 27 December the BLT again landed in its area of operations. Casualties on both sides were very light. (GB-68)(CC 2/26, 12/68).
At the end of 1968, the situation with the SLFs had much in common with the situation at the beginning of the year. One battalion was bringing an operation to a close while the other was attached to a Marine division ashore. There was still controversy about the proper use of the SLF. Later in 1969, Marine Colonel Clyde Hunter, Operations Officer for the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), noted the “divisions were using the SLFs improperly, actually ginning up operations just to get them ashore and tie them down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, that had no connection to their mission as an SLF.” (GB-68).
THE SLF IN 1969
Senior U. S. military commanders continued to debate the proper role of the SLF. Many Marines felt any Marine not ashore and fighting was being underutilized. Consequently, since 1968, the SLFs had been committed ashore more often and for longer periods than originally envisioned. Mindful that the SLF was created to serve as a contingency force throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, these deployments meant the amphibious capabilities of the Seventh Fleet were being restricted, leaving them unavailable to meet sudden crises beyond Vietnam. Navy commanders found it hard to justify the commitment of so many underutilized amphibious assets off the coast of Vietnam. MACV wanted the SLFs available for use in coastal areas other than I Corps. Some Navy commanders agreed with the MACV position; Marine commanders were opposed. Some critics felt amphibious operations in Vietnam were a waste of time and the SLFs should be based ashore permanently. Given the vast responsibilities of the United States in the Western Pacific, should the only units in the Marine Corps engaged in a truly amphibious role be dedicated to the war in Vietnam? (GB-69).
Prior to 1969, all reinforced Marine infantry battalions in Vietnam were eligible for assignment to the SLF for a period of six months. Henceforth, the 26th Marines would provide the BLTs.
In January, both SLFs moved in their shipping to an assembly point off the coast of Quang Ngai province. Their destination was the Batangan Peninsula, an enemy stronghold a dozen miles south of Chu Lai. The Operation, BOLD MARINER, was to be the largest amphibious operation since the Korean War. The operation began on 12 January. The BLT’s were 2/26 (with tanks from 3/A/5TK and Ontos from 1/A/5AT) and 3/26 (with tanks from 3/C/5TK). The operation began on 12 January. The following day, tanks and Ontos from 2/26 were landed to provide security for the beach fire support base. Contact with the enemy was light, and no enemy were reported killed. BLT 2/26 returned to its shipping on 24 January, only to land further north two days later in Operation LINN RIVER. On 28 January, tanks were called up to aid Company G, pinned down by enemy fire from concealed positions. These positions were destroyed, aided by tank .50 caliber machinegun fire. 15 NVA were reported killed during the operation. On 7 February, control of BLT 2/26 passed to the 5th Marines. The BLT participated in Operation TAYLOR COMMON for five days before returning to its shipping. (GB-69)(CC 2/26, 1/69).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 3/26, participated in BOLD MARINER during the period 13-24 January, followed by Operation RUSSELL BEACH (25-31 January). The BLT claimed 32 NVA/VC killed during these operations. (CC 3/26, 1/69).
Both BLTs participated in Operation TAYLOR COMMON, ongoing since December 1968 in the area southwest of Hoi An. BLT 2/26 experienced little enemy contact and claimed no enemy casualties during the period (7-12 February). It returned to its shipping on 13 February. BLT 3/26 joined TAYLOR COMMON on 10 February. Contact with the enemy was substantial: on 27 February alone, Lima Company killed 75 enemy soldiers and destroyed two anti-aircraft sites. The BLT claimed 295 NVA and VC killed; Marine losses were 35 killed and 249 wounded. BLT 3/26 ended its participation in the operation on 8 March. The BLT immediately joined Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS in the same area. Tanks and Ontos were not landed during TAYLOR COMMON or OKLAHOMA HILLS. On 23 March the BLT command group moved to Hill 55. OKLAHOMA HILLS continued throughout April, with the BLT claiming 140 enemy soldiers killed during the month. The BLT destroyed the base camp of the 141st NVA regiment. Large quantities of arms and other supplies were seized. 18 Marines were KIA during April. The BLT ended its participation in OKLAHOMA HILLS on 3 May and returned to its amphibious shipping. (CC 3/26, 2/69)(CC 3/26, 3/69)(CC 3/26, 4/69).
SLF Alpha/BLT 2/26 (with tanks from 3/A/5TK and 4/A/5TK, plus Ontos from 1/A/5AT) participated in Operation EAGER PURSUIT I (1-8 March), a combined amphibious and helicopter assault west of Da Nang. EAGER PURSUIT II followed (9-27 March). The BLT encountered only minor enemy resistance as the enemy avoided major contact. On 1 April, BLT 2/26 was replaced by 1/26 as the BLT with SLF Alpha. (GB-69)(CC 3/26, 3/29).
BLT 1/26, with tanks from 1/A/5TK and Ontos from 1/A/5AT, engaged in an operation north of Da Nang in the Hai Van Pass area along National Route 1. The mission was to provide security and keep the highway open. The operation was successful: traffic was not delayed during the month, nor was any allied vehicles damaged by enemy attack. The BLT embarked to its ARG shipping on 25 April. One Marine and 30 enemy soldiers were killed on this operation during the month. (CC 1/16, 4/69).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 3/26, remained aboard its shipping as the III MAF amphibious reserve until 10 June. At that time, it moved ashore to relieve 2/26, which then became the BLT. After rehabilitation in Okinawa, BLT 2/26 rejoined ARG Bravo on 26 June.
SLF Alpha with BLT 1/26 (tanks from 1/A/5TK; Ontos from 1/A/5AT) conducted Operation DARING REBEL on Barrier Island, south of Da Nang. The operation lasted from 5 to 20 May. The BLT next participated in Operation GALLANT LEADER, in which the BLT moved by helicopter and truck to Hill 55 and engaged in a sweep to the east. GALLANT LEADER was followed by Operation PIPESTONE CANYON, during which the BLT attacked south toward Go Noi Island. During the month, the BLT reported 23 Marine KIA’s and 124 enemy KIA’s (most of the enemy encountered were VC, not NVA). The mission of the tanks and Ontos was to provide an assault capability, provide anti-mechanized defensive capability, and to provide direct and (for tanks) indirect fire support as needed. The battalion remained in this area until 8 June when it withdrew to ships of the amphibious ready group. (GB-69)(CC 1/26, 5/69).
SLF Alpha/BLT 1/26 landed again on Barrier Island on 27 June. This was Operation BOLD PURSUIT. The mission was to search for enemy bunkers and supply caches, locate and destroy enemy forces, and to deny enemy forces access to the area. Contact was light. Three Marines and 34 enemy soldiers were reported killed before the BLT returned to its shipping on 6 July. (CC 1/26, 6/69).
During the period 10-20 July, the BLT participated in Operation MIGHTY PLAY. The landing was on the coast in the southeastern section of Quang Nam province (in the Da Nang TAOR, south of Da Nang). No over-the-beach assault took place. Contact was extremely light. The operation ended on 20 July. (GB-69).
SLF Bravo, with BLT 2/26, after spending several weeks in rehabilitation on Okinawa and training at Subic Bay in the Philippines, began Operation BRAVE ARMADA on 24 July with a landing across the beach about ten miles south of Chu Lai, in Quang Ngai province. Tanks from 2/A/5TK and Ontos from 2/A/5AT were included in the BLT. The operation terminated on 7 August. Results were negligible. (GB-69)(CC 2/26, 8/69). The battalion spent the next month ashore, proving security for military installations around Da Nang.
SLF Alpha and BLT 1/26, after spending a few weeks engaged in training and equipment repair, commenced Operation DEFIANT STAND on 7 September. The target once again was Barrier Island, along the coast between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. This was the first amphibious landing with Republic of Korea Marines (the 2d ROKMC Brigade). The mission was to conduct search and clear operations in order to locate and capture or destroy all enemy forces, caches, and installations. U.S. Marine casualties during the operation were light, and the tanks and Ontos played no significant role. The BLT returned to its shipping and moved to Da Nang on 20 September. (CC 1/26, 9/69).
In October, BLT 1/26 ended its assignment with the Special Landing Force and reverted to 1/26. BLT 2/26, assigned to SLF Bravo, occupied various positions in the Da Nang area. On 27 October BLT 2/26 was redesignated 2/26. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division from South Vietnam in the fall of 1969, the role of the ARG/SLF was considerably scaled back. Although the ARG/SLF would continue to be maintained at a high level of capability and readiness, it was felt that only the launching of a major enemy offensive would warrant reintroducing the force into Vietnam. In November, BLT 1/9 joined SLF Bravo. The following month, BLT 2/9 boarded the ships of SLF Alpha. The forces operated along the coast of South Vietnam, always remaining outside the 12-mile territorial waters limit. (GB-69).
THE SLF IN 1970 - 1971
Operation DEFIANT STAND turned out to be the last SLF operation of the war. In 1970, the 3d Marine Division (now in Okinawa) was tasked with providing the BLTs for the Special Landing Force. The mission of the SLF reverted to what it had been before 1965: the strategic reserve force for the Pacific Command.
The 9th Marines provided the BLTs during the period January 1970 through June 1971. There continued to be two SLFs, with one afloat at a time. Headquartered in Okinawa and training in the Philippines, the SLFs spent only about two days per month along the coast of Vietnam. 9th Marines’ battalions were assigned SLF duty for three-month periods. The Ontos had been phased out as anti-tank vehicles, and most of the Ontos personnel were reassigned to tank and infantry battalions. In late 1970, the Special Landing Force was renamed the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU).
No 31st MAU ground forces went ashore in 1970-71. In February and March 1971, the MAU was assigned the task of feigning an amphibious attack along the coast of North Vietnam in order to influence the disposition of NVA forces in the South. In April, the III MAF withdrew from Vietnam and was replaced by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade (3d MAB) as the Marine headquarters in Vietnam. In May, all Marine ground and air operations ceased. In June, the remaining Marines left Vietnam and the 3d MAB was deactivated. (GB-1970-71).
Peter Brush
Note to reader: You will see throughout Peter Brush’s article source notations which, if followed, will lead you to the applicable volume of “U.S. Marines in Vietnam”. For example: “(GB-1965)” indicates that the previous text was taken from “U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup – 1965”.
Another often-cited source in Mr. Bush’s article is the unit command chronology written by every battalion-sized unit each month. For example: (CC-1/26, 9/69) indicates the source is the Command Chronology of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, September, 1969.